Working Paper IV

Surveillance Policies, Practices and Technologies in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories: Assessing the Security State

by Andrew Stevens *

November 2011

* PhD, Department of Sociology, Queen’s University, Kingston, Ontario.
Summary

The purpose of this report is to document the deployment of surveillance practices and technologies within the state of Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT). Through these discussions, this account will explore the discourses and ideologies that have justified the expansion of surveillance regimes inside Israel proper and point to the overlapping tendencies with regards to basic claims supporting the need for enhanced surveillance systems in both Israel and the OPT.

The report is based on media articles, industry press releases, academic journals and books, as well as position papers and statements from civil society groups dating between 2001 and 2010. It begins by looking at the laws, regulations and rights concerning privacy in Israel. This is followed by a section on state surveillance arising from recent technological advances, specifically the introduction of biometric ID cards and digital databases containing individuals’ biometric and communications information. As this section highlights, while such surveillance technologies can negatively impact the privacy of all individuals in Israel, including Israeli Jews, these technologies can be – and are – used to systematically target certain groups of the population.

In addition to the impacts on individual privacy, the adoption of such surveillance strategies raises issues of discriminatory policies – such as the targeting of certain groups – and citizenship and identity management. Such issues are taken up in the next section which looks at the Israeli state’s racially-based surveillance strategies and policies and the justifications proffered for such policies; namely that of securing itself from existential threat. It looks at behavioural monitoring, racial profiling, and the attitudes towards such differential treatment.

From this, the report moves on to look more closely at the issues of state building, population control and spatial monitoring in relation to surveillance practices deployed, particularly the role of the census as a key tool for population control through categorization. These issues necessarily tie back into discussions on citizenship, identity verification and management in Israel.

The importance of political economy and Israel’s homeland security industry are assessed next. Israel provides an important case study considering its position as a leading exporter of military equipment and a world leader in the development of surveillance and security technologies. In addition to the technological aspects of surveillance and control, Israel’s constellation of security agencies are also responsible for developing surveillance methodologies related but not exclusive to airport security, counter-terrorism, political assassinations, the establishment of indigenous intelligence networks, deployment of CCTV, and the creation of national identification databases. It is, this report suggests, the discourse and political economy of security that guides the expansion of surveillance systems within the state of Israel. This is not intended, however, to distract from the colonial nature of Israel’s ongoing occupation of Palestinian territory, but instead to
provide an intimate account of how surveillance is tied to the legacy of colonialism. A case has also been made by some that the attitudes towards privacy are uniquely Israeli, based on religious-cultural beliefs and conventions within the Jewish faith (Bennett 2009). Such an argument holds little water if one considers the parallels between privacy laws in Israel and other Western countries, particularly those in the European Union. What is unique, however, is how the security apparatus is deployed and the grounds on which it is justified – there is no evidence in the reviewed literature to suggest that these practices are reducible to religious or cultural beliefs alone.

Finally, the report considers the psychological impact resulting from the urbicide and intense, daily surveillance to which Palestinians are subjected, before concluding the report with remarks on the tensions between rights and security and citizenship concerns of the Israeli state.

Privacy laws, regulations, and rights

Prima facie, the Israeli State appears concerned about privacy, and has in place a significant number of laws and legislation related to the protection of privacy. The Electronic Privacy Information Center and Privacy International (2002) issued an international survey report of privacy laws and developments that provided a section devoted to Israel which noted a range of legislation covering privacy laws and regulations, including: Section 7 of the Basic Law on Human Dignity and Freedom; Protection of Privacy Law; Registrar of Databases; Credit Data Service Law; Secret Monitoring Law (1979); the Computer Law (1995); Genetic Information Law; and Freedom of Information Law. Furthermore, the European Commission considers Israel’s data protection laws to offer an adequate level of protection for personal data transferred from countries in the EU. In other words, despite the ubiquitous and ever-increasing surveillance apparatus in Israel, the country boasts numerous laws and judicial oversights guaranteeing personal privacy. Privacy International (2007/12/18) has developed a comprehensive overview of privacy laws and regulations that also provides an account of appeals made by citizens against the state, with many instances of success on behalf of the complainants, thus demonstrating that the legal recourse for individuals who have suffered from privacy intrusion can be effective. In Israel, The Legal Authority for Information Technologies and Privacy Protection, working under the Ministry of Justice, as well as the Knesset’s Constitution, Law and Justice Committee, are examples of parliamentary bodies that ostensibly ensure adherence to basic legal protections.

A more critical assessment of Israel’s security apparatus and legislation has been offered by Halabi (2011) in a recent paper that provides a thorough review of surveillance technologies and practices – ID cards, CCTV, gathering of communication data from communication companies, and biometric databases – deployed by Israel on Israeli citizens. Halabi focuses – compellingly – on a range of legislation governing the use of surveillance within Israel, and the routine violation of these protections by state intelligence and police agencies working in the interest of ‘national security’, including
the newly enacted Law of Criminal Procedures (Enforcement Power-Communication Data) 2007, Protection of Privacy Law of 1981, Article 12 of the International Declaration of Human Rights, Article 17 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966, and Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. One of the most striking elements of Halabi’s investigation is the coverage of Israel’s report to the UN Council for Human Rights, aptly titled ‘State of Emergency’. The report outlines the ‘on-going struggle against acts of violence and terrorism committed by extremist groups’, justifying a need to maintain ‘the state of emergency, which [includes] the exercise of powers to arrest and detention’. The author, himself a practicing lawyer in Jerusalem, concludes that Israel must amend or revoke several laws ‘that have been used to achieve political and Jewish “national” goals’ (i.e., Zionism). This follows from some of the paper’s leading questions, namely the ‘real’ reason for employing surveillance (imminent risk to state security or political suppression) and the status of the right to privacy under Israeli law.

A final avenue to consider as a mean of securing rights beyond the conventional discourse of legal frameworks is that of resistance. Some scholars have emphasized the importance of reconceptualizing the act of urban resistance by supporting spatial protest as an alternative pattern of opposition vis-à-vis the surveillance mechanisms implemented in Israeli cities (Yacobi 2004). In some instances technology has been used to reverse the gaze by surveilling the oppressors rather than the exploited. The Israeli human rights organization, B’Tselem, has responded to human rights violations committed by the IDF by giving Palestinians in the occupied territories the technology and know-how to document their own lives, calling it the ‘Shooting Back’ project. This not only confronts state-sanctioned violence, but also that of growing Jewish settler violence against Palestinians. According to the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, 222 incidents were recorded in the first half of 2008 versus 291 in all of 2007 (Lyon 2008; see also Haaretz 2008). The tactic of empowering people to use technology and deploy it as a means of counter-surveillance can itself operate as a regulatory mechanism by ensuring that legal protections and rights are actually upheld.

**Surveillance using biometrics, ID cards and communications data**

**Biometrics and identification cards**

The introduction of biometric identification in Israel-Palestine follows a history of ID verification systems dating back to the establishment of Israel in 1948. In a broader sense, registries, identity cards, and permit systems can be used to manipulate forms of (non-) citizenship and work in the interests of displacing and dispossessing certain populations whilst gaining territories for others (Abu-Zahra 2008b). Within the OPT, ID cards function as a system of control over the movements and rights of Palestinians within the Territories, where ‘IDs are entangled with a politics of fear, in which political and everyday concerns are tied together’ (Abu-Zahra 2008a; see also Loewenstein 2006). Legal identification is central to the life chances for people in the region, with identity documents penetrating ‘into the lives of those who hold them, not as reifying
abstractions, but as an unpredictable and unstable techniques of governances, producing fear and uncertainty for all those subject to their use’ (Kelly 2006: 89). Even Jewish settlers who were evacuated from Gaza in 2005 and relocated in Israel have also voiced concern over their lack of identification papers after the evacuation (Sofer 2005). As a tool adopted for the purpose of administering the OPT, ID cards and identification registries have a clear mandate, however invasive, when used by security agencies in their attempts at controlling the Palestinian population.¹

It was in 1997, after a long history of unilaterally securing its undeclared borders by force, that Israel realized the traditional methods of identifying persons by the use of ID cards was becoming increasingly more problematic. Identification cards could be forged; it took too long to verify the owner of the card; individuals could have more than one ID card by using an alias; and identification was based on the judgement of an inspector. The solution, it was argued, could be found in biometrics, ‘the means of being able to record measurable, physical characteristic or personal behavioural traits to recognize the identity, or verify the claimed identity, of an enrollee’ (Flink 2002). Using language that suggests Israel’s border security policy is determined by technological possibilities, Flink (2002) notes that biometric ID cards could permit the establishment of open borders, allowing for the ‘Palestinian population to enter and exit Israel’ while at the same time having in place an efficient means to verify identities. Pilot projects, such as HandGeometry readers, that began in airports have since been deployed at several border crossings.

The debate over biometrics shifted from technological feasibility to national policy in 2008 when the Knesset passed a bill – dubbed the ‘identification card, travel papers and biometrics database bill’ (Somfalvi 2008) – to establish a biometric database that would require all Israelis to have a chip installed in their ID cards and passports with records of their fingerprints and facial scans. As of 2002, 80,000 Israeli citizens had already been enrolled in the biometric identification system (Electronic Privacy Information Center and Privacy International 2002); by 2006 this increased to 300,000 (Privacy International 2007). Reservations over this initiative were noted by the left-wing Hadash and Meretz parties, and one Labour MK (Lis 2009); even a member of Likud, Michael Eitan, refused to support his party’s position on the bill (Jeffay 2009). According to reports, the entire biometric database would be deleted in several years if policy makers decided not to implement the law in full (Lis 2009).

It is worth drawing attention to the qualitative transformation of identification systems when the question of biometrics is introduced. According to the International Biometrics Industry Association (IBIA), a US-based organization that represents major biometric companies, the technology is defined thus:

¹ Ironically, it was this very surveillance technology that allowed for the retrospective tracking of Mossad agents implicated in the assassination of alleged Hamas arms dealer, Mahmoud al Mabhouh, in Dubai (Oren 2010).
Biometric technology involves the automatic identification or verification of an individual based on physiological or behavioral characteristics. Such authentication is accomplished by using computer technology in non-invasive ways to match patterns of live individuals in real time against enrolled records that use face, iris, hand, fingerprint, signature, and voice measurements in applications such as border control, information security, physical access control, financial privacy safeguards, time and attendance management, law enforcement, and other civil and government uses.

(cited in Zureik and Hindle 2004: 116)

The technology uses two main methods: verification (or authentication) and identification. According to Zureik and Hindle (2004: 117), verification ‘confirms that people are who they say they are, while identification determines who the person is. Regardless of the biometrics measured, the technology relies on pattern recognition, which converts images into a binary code by means of an algorithm’.

Because of the technological sophistication involved in biometrics, the digitization of surveillance practices draws attention to the wider trends of privatization, liberalization and social polarizations identified by scholars (Graham and Wood 2003). Just as broader transformations involved with the digital nature of surveillance technologies solicit new developments in the ways we can theorize surveillance itself, so too does the digitization of biometric databases in the colonial setting shed light on qualitative changes in the methods of categorizing, tracking, and controlling populations. For Muller (2004: 280), biometric identification systems represent a shift from discourses of citizenship to identity management, through which questions of citizenship become quests for verifying/authenticating ‘identity’ for the purpose of granting access to ‘rights, bodies, spaces, and so forth’. Muller’s argument that cultural and ethnic attributes of citizenship are ‘stripped away’ in the biometrization process, however, reaches an impasse in the context of a religio-ethnic state, as in the case of Israel, where citizenship and national identities are fused with specifically ascribed attributes. Attributes, it is worth adding, are used to include certain populations just as they are to exclude others. Nevertheless, the case being made – that identity management is at the same time a question of securitization – certainly holds weight in the instance of Israel.

In the case of the introduction of the biometric identification system, what sparked controversy was not the existence of a national ID system, which had long since been in place, but the creation of a massive centralized computer database that would contain biometric information on each citizen. Much of the reporting focused on the stated objective of the biometric database, which was to address the problem of forgery, identity theft and other criminal activities, as well as the improvement of services as part of the country’s ‘SmartID’ project (Ben-Artzi 2008), which would be administered by a dedicated authority under the Ministry of Interior and the Public Security Ministry. According to then-Interior Minister, Meir Sheerit, biometric cards would assist in ‘uprooting crime, foiling terror attacks and identifying victims’ (Ilan 2009). Details of
international travellers passing through Israel were supposed to be exempt from the registry (Ben-Artzi 2008).

Despite the appeal of improving security provisions, there was widespread opposition to the biometric project. Civil society groups and legal associations argued that the law ‘would give the authorities power to violate certain rights of privacy and human dignity’, which is recognized in Israel’s Basic Laws (Haaretz 2009/11/17). The Israeli Bar Association sent a letter to Justice Minister Daniel Friedman, asking him to postpone the decision of the bill pending the Bar’s investigation of possible implications. ‘Forming such a database would harm the citizens’ basic right to privacy’, the letter read; adding that the database would be at risk of being hacked and would make ‘potential criminals out of every law-abiding citizen’ (cited in Somfalvi 2008). The threat of data leakages poses a unique security threat, but more ominous is the threat the database poses to democracy itself, as some reports suggest (Ilan 2009).

As the head of privacy-protection campaigns at the Association for Civil Rights in Israel argued, the storage of this sensitive information on citizens could mean a ‘slippery slope to an undemocratic state’ (Jeffay 2009). Even an annual report by the State Comptroller, Micha Lindenstrauss, released in May 2009, raised doubts about the ability of the government to safeguard private data (Jeffay 2009). For instance, 46 public sector workers were indicted by the Jerusalem Attorney’s office in December 2001 for selling information from classified databases on citizens (Electronic Privacy Information Center and Privacy International 2002). An editorial in Haaretz broadened the debate by adding that Israel is also making a push to have Palestinians surrender their own biometric data in a process of ‘biometrization’, which promised improved freedom of mobility, but instead the ‘card has transformed into just a tool for collecting information’ (Hass 2009). The initiative promoted by ‘professional voyeurs’ is located in the interest of ‘security demands’, according to numerous critical accounts in the press (ibid) as well as statements by the Association for Civil Rights in Israel (2009). It is safe to conclude that, despite attempts made by Israeli politicians to paint the question of biometrics as one of increased national and personal security, civil society organizations and legal associations have maintained their opposition to the registry.

**Communications surveillance**

The question of constructing a massive database on citizens is not restricted to biometrics, but extends further to include information related to telephone numbers and other communications data. In 2007 the Knesset voted 35 to 5 to approve a bill that permits police to establish a massive database or search engine based on this information. The new law will allow police to request a judge’s order to obtain communications data from a database that includes telephone numbers, names of mobile phone subscribers, serial numbers of mobile phones, and maps of antenna locations. The Knesset rejected requests to grant the police authority to receive lists of internet addresses in Israel (Ilan 2007).
Because of the comprehensive nature of this bill, it wasn’t long before media pundits dubbed the initiative the ‘Big Brother’ law. As Michael (2007) facetiously remarked, any ‘online flatulence by anyone will be recorded, documented, numbered, filed, and added to the giant database, which will be available to the Israeli Police’. However this commentary should not be confused for an opposition to increased security. The author continues by arguing that what the Israeli Police truly need is ‘worthy manpower and worthy salaries’, not ‘inflated databases’. Gideon Levy (2008) voiced similar consternation over the enlargement of ‘Big Brother’ powers within security circles, noting that from the biometric database and police-run telephone call database, the ‘path is a short one to harsher tools in the war on crime and terror, such as a DNA database for all citizens’.

The concern over expanding the power of police to monitor communication data is not ill-founded. Between 2006 and 2007, wiretapping increased by over 100 per cent in drug investigations and by 172 per cent in the fight against ‘organized crime’, according to figures submitted by the police to the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee (Ilan 2008). Electronic surveillance overall increased by 22 per cent from 1,128 instances in 2006 to 1,375 in 2007. As a comparison, authorities in the United States conducted a total of 1,839 wiretaps in all of 2006. Israeli courts refused only 11 surveillance requests by the police in 2007 (Ilan 2008). In total, police eavesdropped on 778 suspects and witnesses on 1,205 telephone and cell phone lines (Yoaz 2007/12/06).

A more unsettling article discovered that licences received by cell phone carriers from the state include a secret codicil requiring them to give Shin Bet (The General Security Services) information about conversations and messages that subscribers transmit on their mobile phones, according to the Movement for Freedom of Information in Israel (Yoaz 2007/09/25). This sparked a debate within the Knesset Constitution, Law and Justice Committee about the extent of judicial oversight that is needed when passing on communications data. A security appendix, however, permits security services to retrieve citizens’ communication data without judicial supervision and without the citizens’ knowledge (ibid). To add to this, the Israel Defense Forces military censor operated a special surveillance facility in Tel Aviv for over thirty years, officially designed to eavesdrop on phone conversations of foreign journalists reporting to their home countries (Haaretz 2007). In some cases, however, the state has prosecuted IDF employees for misusing phone records of journalists, business people, and media personalities who have been victims of illegal surveillance (Electronic Privacy Information Center and Privacy International 2002). Ironically, there is little evidence of internet surveillance or control in the Palestinian territories, other than the blocking of sexually explicit sites in Gaza by the Palestinian Authority (OpenNet Initiative 2009). This is despite the control wielded by a virtual monopoly holder, PalTel, over telecommunications and Israel’s dominance over the communications spectrum (World Bank 2008a; World Bank 2008b).
Racially-based surveillance policies and its justifications

Racial profiling, in most contexts, provokes offence. In the case of Israel, however, it is a screening and surveillance model that is openly and routinely used. Israeli behavioural profiling methods, Whitaker (2011) suggests, are arguably necessary for a state fixated on the importance of ever-improving security measures. At the same time the author problematizes the racially-based deployment and development of such security protocols. Aside from Israel being a leading developer and exporter of surveillance equipment, the country’s military-security industry is also a world leader in the perfection of surveillance methodologies and techniques. Using the airport as the central case study, Whitaker examines the now-ubiquitous screening procedures that were built in Israel’s vast web of security-related laboratories and security agencies (for a review of technology see Kloosterman 2010). Similarly, Pfeffer (2009) assesses the development of racial profiling as an anti-terrorist and security measure initially used by Israel’s security agencies within airports. This method is credited with virtually eliminating all terrorist attacks in Israeli airports since the 1970s. ‘Many Israelis have no problems with this [strategy]’, Pfeffer reflects. ‘Let the Muslims suffer for the sins of their brothers. But those of us who like to think of ourselves as liberal humanists find it too easy to ignore the sight of entire families having their luggage rummaged through in front of the entire terminal while we are waved through’. In this sense, privileged Jewish Israeli’s become complacent with the extent to which the security apparatus provides them protection, while simultaneously disenfranchising and oppressing others.

Much of Whitaker’s argument can be summarized as follows:

> Looked at strictly as a security measure, Israeli passenger profiling has a number of strengths. Even its critics acknowledge that *it works*. However, looking at it simply as a socially and politically neutral security technique misses a great deal that is critical to grasping the significance of passenger profiling in its specific Israeli context.


While the system does indeed function successfully based on a rudimentary risk management approach to security, the process discriminates against certain populations and repugnant from the point of view of human rights. Again, for those individuals considered full citizens, security and surveillance become a banal experience, part of the everyday fabric of social and political life, and not a practice to be questioned or undermined.

Regarding such general acceptance of surveillance practices, in an article that appeared in *The Privacy Advisor*, Bennett (2009) captures important perspectives that take account of Israeli attitudes towards privacy. A case is made that personal privacy is consistent with traditional religious and cultural beliefs rooted in Judaism, which has helped establish legislative, constitutional, and judicial protections. However, Bennett also notes that in
conversation with jurists and experts in law, it is not uncommon to find a ‘survival first’ sentiment towards the deployment of surveillance within Israel. In other words, the existential threats that Israel faces are legion, and the security of statehood and citizenry must take precedence over the security of privacy, however committed Israelis are to this notion as a right. But the official stance on national security is not without mainstream critics.

The independent Israeli daily, Haaretz, featured an article condemning a bill passed by the Knesset that allows the police to ‘enter anyone’s home in order to collect evidence, without the owner being present, without informing him in advance and without even informing him after the fact’ (Haaretz 2009/12/19). While concealed entry is permitted only in terror cases in the United States, and the person whose house was searched must be informed no more than a month afterward, the Israeli proposal includes no such restrictions or limitations. The bill was proposed in response to what Haaretz called a ‘justified fear’ of soaring crime. Similarly, the crime argument was used to justify the installation of surveillance cameras on top of high-rise buildings in Jerusalem, the first Israeli city to follow the public safety policies already in place in the UK, the US, and Canada (Vos Iz Neias 2010). The surveillance network is part of a plan to combat violence that was announced in 2009 by Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu (Miskin 2010).

**Racially-based policing methods**

In spite of pretences that the Palestinian community within Israel is entitled to the same rights and privileges offered to the nation’s Jewish citizenry, an announcement in 2009 revealed that special undercover units of the police had been infiltrating and collecting intelligence on Israel’s Arab minority (Cook 2009). Cook describes an account of events stemming from the first public admission that the Israeli police are using methods adopted in the OPT against the country’s 1.3 million Arab citizens. This is in response to what David Cohen, the national police commissioner at the time, noted was a lack of an intelligence infrastructure within Israel specifically intended to deal with the Arab community (Zarchin 2009). The Shin Bet used these secret agents, known in Hebrew as mistaaravim, inside Arab communities shortly after the state was founded. The mistaaravim have been used as agent provocateurs throughout the OPT. Adalah, a Palestinian legal rights group in Israel, warned that the unit violates individual rights of the Arab minority and risked introducing ‘racial profiling’ into Israeli policing.

As new as this might have been for Jewish readers of Israel’s dailies, the Arab population has been well aware of the mistaaravim in their neighbourhoods for quite some time (Kashua 2009). Hillel Cohen’s (2010) provocative account of how Palestinian Arabs were recruited by Israel’s security services around the time of Israel’s founding, otherwise known as the Nakba, provides an excellent historical document of how on-the-ground native informants and infiltration units acted as the vanguards of wider colonial systems of surveillance and control. As Cohen concludes, ‘While the methods used today are presumably not the same ones used in the 1950s, the political activity of Palestinians
in Israel, even when legitimate, is still under surveillance, and the level of involvement of the security services in Arab local and national politics is still significant’ (2010: 238).

Further to the point of local informants, a 1994 report by B’Tselem (1994) took account of the human rights violations committed by Israeli authorities during the Intifada in the recruitment and operation of collaborators in the OPTs. The study also examined the retaliation against collaborators, noting that, according to IDF sources, 942 Palestinians were killed by other Palestinians on suspicion of collaboration between December 9, 1987 and November 30, 1993. Between 35 and 40 per cent of those killed were employed by the government or connected in some other way to the Israeli administration. There is also extensive literature exposing the long history of secret police surveillance of Arab Israeli Islamic leaders (Cook 2010), international activists (International Solidarity Movement 2010), and Palestinian community leaders (White 2010). Even Arab Members of Knesset are scrutinized and indeed punished for supposed transgressions against the Israeli state (see Haaretz 2010/05/24; Haaretz 2010/04/10).

Other cases have revealed agents provocateur allegedly working for Israel’s Shin Bet security services damaged six Palestinian churches with the intent of inciting violence (Hass 2006). According to Hass, ‘the Israeli security services are careful to act within the framework of a clear political paradigm: maximum weakening, in every possible way, of the Palestinian national collective, so that it will not be able to realize its goal and establish a state worthy of the name, in accordance with international resolutions’. Practices such as these led Israeli film maker, Eyal Sivan, to draw comparison between the East German Stasi and the security services in Israel in his film, Seven Days. ‘The idea in the film is to show how evil in East Germany, as in Israel, was mainstream’, Sivan remarked. ‘Evil was justified there, as was the soldier, who justifies his actions with obedience to the law, in acting for the state and security’ (Elazari 2006).

**State building, citizenship and the census**

The state-building question, as well as the deployment of security services, is worth considering in relation to the questions of citizenship and demography. As Zureik (2001) argues, the population count and spatial monitoring are both central aspects of surveillance practices deployed in the historical and contemporary role of the census that, in the Palestinian and Israeli case, led to the social construction of spaces and categorization of people. The questions of territory and governmentality have prompted scholars to examine the implication of checkpoints, identification documents, permit systems, and the general infrastructure of security in the broader context of biopolitical control over the occupied Palestinian population (Parsons and Salter 2008), which is made possible by intensive surveillance. Official statistics and the national census have been instrumental in the construction of modern political institutions, particularly the state and citizenship, but the use of the census as a mechanism of exclusion – or, who is deliberately not counted – is equally important (Leibler and Breslau 2005). Such was the case during Israel’s formation in 1948 and later during the Six Day War in 1967, when Israel conducted a general census in the recently occupied territories (Leibler 2009). For
Leibler (2004: 121), this is part of a deeper process in which the state is used by the discipline of statistics, and how the Central Bureau of Statistics assisted in the emergence of a ‘statistical scientific community that could present itself as dissociated from politics’. In addition to the role the census plays in categorizing peoples and spaces with the interest of domination and control, others have argued that the census should be placed in the context of a Palestinian political struggle for sovereignty against the Israeli state (Wilkins 2004).

Finally, just as the mistaaravim have been used to gather intelligence and create divisions within Palestinian communities for the past sixty years, so too have policies of citizenship led to similar results. For instance, between December 1995 and March 1999, Israel began revoking the residency permits of Palestinians who moved outside of Jerusalem’s municipal borders. Residents of the West Bank and Jerusalem who reside in Gaza for work or marriage were classified by Israel as living ‘abroad’, effectively serving the goal of changing the demographics of the old city of East Jerusalem (Tadros 2008). Expulsions have increased recently under new military orders, which are sanctified by amendments to a 1969 act – itself amended in 1980 – allowing for the detention and deportation of those described as ‘infiltrators’ (Ma’an 2010). This has drawn condemnation from B’Tselem (2010), largely because of the clear human rights violations and ill-treatment, violence and torture of Palestinians at the hands of agents with Israel’s various security agencies. According to another Israeli human rights organization, HaMoked, the order would target Palestinians born in Gaza and foreign nationals married to Palestinians residing in the West Bank. When the order is put into full effect, Hass (2010) points out, ‘tens of thousands of Palestinians will automatically become criminal offenders liable to be severely punished’. Others have used more strongly worded language by suggesting that the practice acts a charter for ethnic cleansing (Shaoul 2010).

The Palestinian ID card and identification system is being used to facilitate the expulsions, with intimidation, harassment, violence, and internal closures adding to the repertoire of occupation (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre 2008). Gaza is quite literally being used as a deportation and prison camp for those Palestinians residing in the West Bank, further deepening the impoverishment beset on Gaza’s already-crammed residents. This perpetuates a long-standing Israeli policy, as B’Tselem (1991) emphasized in its study of the deportation of women and children from the West Bank in the late 1980s and early 1990s. More recently, B’Tselem (2008) has argued that Israel has abandoned its obligations under international law, which requires the occupier to ‘take all the measures in his power to restore, and ensure, as far as possible, public order and safety’, under the Hague Regulations. Despite formally acknowledging its obligations to comply with humanitarian provisions of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, and the Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Israel, it is charged, has failed to uphold these principles. As a result, these policies have resulted in the breaking up of Palestinian families spread throughout the OPT. Such is the case of Lana and Taiseer Khatib, a husband and wife separated by a controversial
Citizenship and Entry Law, introduced in Israel five years ago during the second Palestinian uprising (Sharp 2010).

Taiseer is an (Arab) Israeli citizen while Lana is from the West Bank, meaning that Mrs. Khatib cannot apply for and acquire citizenship. By some estimates, approximately 15,000 couples are affected by the law. Critics, who include Jewish and Arab Israelis, say it is a matter of using the nation’s proclaimed standards of democracy and equal rights to overturn what they see as ‘racist legislation’. While there are possibilities for exemption under restricted circumstances – for instance, it allowed women over 25 and men over 35 to apply for temporary permits to live in Israel – full citizenship is virtually ruled out. In direct contrast, non-Jews who marry Jewish Israelis can apply for citizenship through a five-year process, which includes individual security checks. Opponents say the law contradicts Israel’s self-declared commitment to equal rights. The Israel-Arab rights organization, Adalah, has petitioned the Supreme Court against the law. From the perspective of demographics and security, Danny Danon, a member of the Israeli Knesset for the governing Likud Party, comments: ‘The well-being of Israelis comes before any other rights… I don't think it's a racist law. But we have to make sure Israel stays a Jewish democratic country’ (Sharp 2010). Security trumps other concerns and the question of a demographic threat weighs heavily on establishment of this law.

**Political economy and technology**

A discussion of surveillance within Israel would be incomplete without a confrontation with political economy and the development of security technologies. Neve Gordon (2009) argues that the ‘Israeli experience’, in its various manifestations, has played a pivotal role in the formation of Israel’s homeland security industry and its subsequent transformation into a global success story. The innovations in security and military technologies developed in Israeli laboratories have also facilitated the increased ‘virtual occupation’ of Gaza since the ‘Disengagement Plan’ (Sperotto 2010). Israel’s ‘separation barrier’, widely cited as a violation of Palestinian human rights, is premised on an array of sniper towers, electric fences, trenches, cameras, sensors, patrol roads, ditches, and military patrols (International Court of Justice 2004; B’Tselem 2006; International Federation for Human Rights 2004) – a blend of technological devises and various surveillance techniques developed in Israel.

Obtaining precise data about security and surveillance industries within Israel through the Central Bureau of Statistics is difficult, but one sector entitled ‘Security, Safety, Defense’ offers some insight, as it lists 334 homeland security companies, the vast majority of which are surveillance-related. Despite its modest population, Israeli military exports constitute 10 per cent of global arms sales. The tight relationship between the military and research and development institutions produces a vibrant security-surveillance-arms complex, with most of these companies being part of Israel’s booming high-tech sector. Israel’s military-industrial complex maintains a close relationship between the
government, the private sector, and public institutions such as universities in the R&D and production of military technology (Sharon 2004). Nick Denes (2011) also offers a rich analysis of Israel’s defence industry from a political-economic vantage point, but the main thrust of the work ‘attends to those territorial and oppositional imaginaries which lend an uncertain form to the “violent geographies” of the Global War on Terror (GWoT), focusing particularly on the nebulous, but paradoxically central, notion of “border” and “border security’” (2011: 171). The centrepiece of Israel’s battlefield laboratories is, Denes argues, the Unmanned Aerial Vehicle (UAV), part of what Johnson (2009) describes as the ‘warfare of inequality management’. Indeed, this work draws attention to the patchwork of the Israeli military-industrial complex’s commercial interests, Zionism’s relationship with security and surveillance systems, colonialism and occupation, and linkages between concepts of ‘borders’, spaces, and UAV technology.

What these political-economic perspectives on surveillance offer is a ‘made in Israel’ approach to the development of security strategies and methodologies, as well as the construction of a surveillance apparatus that is deployed in Israel, the OPT, and abroad by purchasers of this know-how. The IDF’s recent upgrades to the Gaza fence is noteworthy, considering the interface between the military through the newly-upgraded Combat Collection Corps, the network of intelligence agents working within Gaza, surveillance technologies, and national security policies determined to enforce iron clad borders (Katz 2010). This provides a testing ground of sorts for military strategy, technology, and border policies that could effectively be adapted for use outside of Israel. In 2006, Elbit Systems was awarded a contract, along with Boeing, to build the security wall on the U.S.-Mexican border (World War 4 Report 2006). Because of the international public acclaim that accompanies Israel’s defence industry, Israeli-based firms, as well as foreign companies that contribute to the country’s security apparatus, such as Motorola, Elbit, Boeing and others, have become targets of the transnational boycott, divestment, and sanctions (BDS) campaign (Macdonald 2010; New York Campaign for the Boycott of Israel n.d.; The Council on Ethics 2009; Cattatori 2009; Campaign Against U.S. Terror Weapons n.d.), which constitute the central internationalist non-violent movement against Israel’s illegal military occupation of Palestinian territory and continuous defiance of international law (see Bakan and Abu-Laban 2009).

The psychosis of surveillance and security

Exemplified by Abuji-dí’s (2009) Palestinian States/Spaces of Exception thesis, the condition of exception for populations within the OPT entails all aspects of life – not only the juridical and legal – which ‘perpetually destroys and regenerates itself in an extreme form’. Most important, Abuji-dí constructs an analysis of spatial conditions based on the daily experience of Palestinians, classified by four States of Exception: the State of Exile and Refuge; the State of Paradox; the State of Occupation and Siege; and the State of Urbicide. The framework encompasses the legal and juridical nature of Israeli
occupation, spatial surveillance, the socio-cultural and economic dimensions of Palestinian existence, and the impacts of urbicide on people’s understanding of self, other, and place.

By violently dismantling the urban, civil, and infrastructural foundation of the proto-Palestinian state, Israel has sought to deny the Palestinian people their collective, individual and cultural rights to the ‘city-based modernity long enjoyed by Israelis’, as Graham (2002) documents. This was undertaken by Ariel Sharon in a move to deliberately imprison Palestinians to indefinite poverty. Added to the more recent siege of Gaza in 2009, when more than 1300 Palestinians were killed during the 22 days of aerial and ground attacks, urbicide, occupation, and the securitization/in-securitization of the West Bank and Gaza – through which particular populations enhance their security and safety at the expense of others – this has resulted in a severe deterioration of health and well-being for Palestinians (Batniji et al. 2009). The violence inflicted by the state is paralleled by the fear induced by the settlers on the local Palestinians (see Cook 2008; Nenonen 2009; Applied Research Institute Jerusalem 2007). What is implied, though not rigorously analyzed in the accounts of Spaces/States of Exemption and ‘urbicide’ is the psychological impact of surveillance and security regimes.

The literature surveying surveillance in the workplace has long documented the stress, reduced job satisfaction, turnover, physical health problems, anxiety, depression, anger, and severe fatigue that can accompany monitoring at work (Zweig 2005; Martin and Freeman 2003; Bain and Taylor 2002; International Labour Organization 1993). More recently, research has begun to focus on the paranoia that arises as a consequence of the increasing prevalence of surveillance in the public sphere. Psychiatrists Joel Gold and Ian Gold have come to term this growing form of psychosis the Truman Show Delusion, after the famed movie starring Jim Carrey (Kershaw 2008; Wright 2008).

References to popular culture, literary genres, and film are indeed the predominant sources that take account of the questions, dilemmas, implications, and challenges posed by the increasingly sophisticated forms of surveillance that occupy public and private spaces (Holm 2009). Scholars such as Low (2006) and Harper (2008) have also chartered the political significance of paranoia, in terms of how public landscapes are transformed to facilitate surveillance systems and how concerns over surveillance that were once seen as civil rights violations have been turned into acceptance following the attacks on September 11 (see also Coaffee, O’Hare, and Hawkesworth 2009). For Isin (2004), the construction of a neoliberal subject, one that is understood as ‘calculating, responsible, autonomous, and unencumbered’ has meant that public policy is less concerned with managing risks associated with (in)security and more focused on the management of paranoia. The rise of the neurotic citizen, for Isin, ‘signals a new type of politics (neuropolitics) and power (neuropower)’, which lends to the construction of a new government rationality, ‘neoliberalism’. The relevance of such a concept is far more applicable – if accepted – to the privileged (Jewish) citizens of Israel who are called upon (and push for) to support ever-deepening security practices within Israel and throughout
the OPT in order to secure the settler project. The State/Space of Exception, articulated by Abujidi (2009), is itself part of this same goal of expanding security for one population over another. Urbicide is equally complementary to these security woes, which has prompted the razing of Palestinian homes in order to enhance the safety of settlers in the West Bank. It can be argued, however, that the fears that grip Palestinians are hardly delusions or paranoia, but lived realities that are experienced daily through ceaseless interrogations, checkpoints, aerial surveillance, and ID systems.

Conclusion

Despite the element of existential fear guiding the expansion of surveillance and security systems in Israel, it is incorrect to assume that there is a lack of opposition or dissent from established political positions. Liberal elements concede that the basic rule of law regarding the question of privacy must be upheld. This, it is argued, is a principle of liberal democracy, to which the Israeli state ostensibly subscribes. Like the countries of Western Europe, Canada, and the United States, Israel provides a host of privacy protections and substantive checks on the power of the state to monitor its citizens. However this adherence to liberal notions of privacy is not without contradiction. As the studies reviewed in this report suggest, there persists a tension between individual rights and the needs of a Zionist state project demanding domestic and external security. For Jewish Israelis, the state has justified biometrics, CCTV, and other surveillance practices as a means of curbing crime; such measures appear a rather heavy-handed approach to dealing with what is a rather banal threat to public security, not on the magnitude of terrorism or armed conflict. However, the spectre of national security remains ever-present, even if not explicitly presented as the central justification. On the other hand, the discourse and practice of these new security initiatives makes implicit and explicit assertions that the real threat to peace and security is a certain faction of the population, i.e., Arab Israelis.

The watchful eye of the state has extended its gaze to another marginalized population residing within Israel, the foreign illegal workers. ‘If you happen to see men hiding in the bushes and watching you go about your pre-Pessah chores, don’t be alarmed’, one Jerusalem Post articles reads, ‘they may simply be Interior Ministry officials looking to see if you have illegal workers helping you out’ (Friedman 2010). As part of the ominously titled ‘Clean and Tidy’ campaign, the Population, Immigration and Borders Authority (PIBA) has embarked on a plan to enforce the total prohibition on employing foreign citizens without the appropriate permits. Domestic surveillance not only focuses on Arab citizens of Israel, but on the thousands of undocumented workers that provide essential services within the country. Preventing the migration of undocumented workers into Israel has also been one justification supporting a new security fence on the border with Egypt. According to reports, the fence appears mainly to stop African asylum seekers from entering through Egypt, and when complete, the new sections of the fence will mean that Israel will almost be entirely closed in (McCarthy 2010). The question of citizenship and rights is now a pressing concern for workers that have been recruited to
labour in Israel. It is with these policies in mind that the biometric ID database debate becomes increasingly more important. As such, the ‘state of emergency’ discourse is a fitting point of departure when considering the guiding principles behind Israeli security policies.

References


B’Tselem: The Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories.


Cattatori, Silvia (2009/12/7) ‘How Israeli arms companies benefit from European Union science funds’, Silvia Cattori: Political writings.


New York Campaign for the Boycott of Israel (n.d.) ‘Why Motorola’.

http://opennet.net/research/profiles/gazawestbank (accessed May 24, 2010).

Oren, Amir (2010/02/17) ‘Under surveillance / Big Brother changes everything’,


